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GLOBALISM, PUBLIC POLICY, AND TAX-
EXEMPT STATUS: ARE U.S. CHARITIES 
ADRIFT ATSEA?* 
NICHOLAS A. MIRKA Y" 
"Here is my first principle of Foreign Policy-good 
government at home."1 
-William E. Gladstone, 
U.K. Prime Minister 
This Article wrestles with whether charitable organizations' 
international activities can or should impact such organizations' 
domestic tax exemption. It addresses the issues raised by such 
international activities-if those activities contravene current U.S. 
foreign policy or international law, is a charity's tax-exempt 
status adversely affected? Does such contravention implicate the 
public policy doctrine? On one hand, this Article agrees with 
other legal scholars that the public policy doctrine needs 
congressional attention, including some codification of the 
doctrine to provide legislative boundaries and ensure against 
arbitrary and capricious application by the Internal Revenue 
Service ("IRS"). On the other hand, this Article contends that the 
automatic inclusion of u.s. foreign policy and international law 
as components of "established public policy" would be 
administratively impracticable and onerous and would result in 
significant compliance difficulties for charitable organizations. 
Considering all these challenges, this Article nevertheless 
proposes that some codification of the public policy doctrine 
accompanied by a listed transaction scheme, similar to those 
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employed in other areas of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"), 
could provide Congress and ultimately the IRS with the ability to 
target certain international activities as inherently in conflict with 
tax-exempt status. In addition, this Article proposes that the 
codification of the public policy doctrine should include an 
excise tax regime, as an alternative to revocation, to address 
isolated or small violations of the public policy doctrine in 
relation to a charitable organization's overall tax-exempt 
activities. Although these proposals are not without pitfalls and 
criticisms, they will nevertheless provide practical guidance to 
charitable organizations, thereby aiding compliance and 
ensuring uniform treatment of charitable organizations with 
international activities or operations. 
INTRODUCfION ....................................................................................... 852 
I. THE PUBLIC POLICY IMP ACf ON CHARITABLE 
EXEMPTION ................................................................................... 860 
A. Overview of the Federal Income Tax Exemption ............... 860 
B. The Public Policy Doctrine .................................................. 863 
1. Overview-Bob Jones University v. United States ....... 863 
2. Criticism of the Public Policy Doctrine ........................ 867 
II. EXAMINING THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCfRINE IN LIGHT OF 
GLOBALIZED PHILANTHROPY ................................................... 871 
A. U.S. Foreign Policy-Does It Constitute "Established 
Public Policy"? ...................................................................... 871 
B. International Law as an Established Source of Public 
Policy ...................................................................................... 876 
III. MOVING FORWARD-REFINING THE PUBLIC POLICY 
DOCfRINE TO ADDRESS CHARITIES' INTERNATIONAL 
ACTIVITIES .................................................................................... 880 
A. Limited Codification of the Public Policy Doctrine ........... 880 
B. Excise Tax Regime as an Alternative Enforcement Tool 
for Public Policy Violations .................................................. 883 
C. Difficulties and Potential Criticisms .................................... 885 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 887 
INTRODUCTION 
Globalism knows no strangers, and charitable organizations are 
no exception.2 In 2010, domestic religious organizations alone gave 
2. This Article uses the terms "charitable organization," "tax-exempt organization," 
"exempt organization," and "charities" to refer to nonprofit organizations that qualify for, 
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$7.2 billion to developing countries, including support for disaster 
relief, housing, food and clothing, schools, and development projects.3 
Domestic operating foundations provided $4.6 billion in aid to 
developing countries.4 These astounding figures reflect the reality 
that domestic charitable organizations are increasingly global in their 
reach. Ostensibly, in most instances, financial and other support 
provided by domestic charities likely comports with, and furthers, 
those charities' tax-exempt purposes and missions. And, current 
federal income tax law does not explicitly prohibit charitable 
organizations from channeling donated funds in support of 
international organizations or even activities that violate current U.S. 
foreign policy or international law, unless that international 
organization constitutes a terrorist organization. 5 But, what if a 
domestic charity'S international activities, including financial support, 
do not further its tax-exempt purpose? Specifically, what if a domestic 
charity channels its funds to support a foreign organization or activity 
that violates current U.S. foreign policy? 
Commentators have recently raised this issue in the context of 
contributions to the development of Jewish settlements in the West 
Bank and East Jerusalem.6 Although settlements in the West Bank 
and have been granted, an exemption from federal income tax. See I.R.c. § SOl(c)(3) 
(2006). In addition, the terms "exemption" and "tax-exempt status" refer exclusively to 
federal income tax law and do not imply exemption under other federal tax laws, or under 
state or local laws, unless otherwise indicated. See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Is It "Charitable" 
to Discriminate? The Necessary Transformation of Section 50I(c)(3) into the Gold 
Standard for Charities, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 4S, 56-60 for a discussion of the meaning of 
"charitable" under § SOl(c)(3) of the Code and the common practice of collectively 
referring to the entities listed in the statute (e.g., religious, educational, scientific, etc.) as 
"charitable. " 
3. HUDSON INST., INDEX OF GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY AND REMITTANCES 2012, at 
8, 12 (2012), http://www.hudson.orglfiles/publications/ 
2012IndexofGlobaIPhilanthropyandRemittances.pdf. 
4. ld. at 8, 11. 
S. See § SOl(p) ("suspend[ing) by operation of law" an organization's tax-exempt 
status if the organization has engaged in, or supported, a terrorist organization as defined 
in § S01(p)(2». Federal income tax law also disallows any deductions for contributions to 
such suspended organizations. See id. § S01(p)(4). But see id. §§ 4942,4945 (2006 & Supp. I 
2007); Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-2 C.B. S07 (governing qualifying distributions by private 
foundations to foreign organizations, none of which specifically address the result if such 
distributions potentially violate U.S foreign policy or international law). This Article does 
not purport nor conclude that any of the organizations or examples discussed in its 
introduction implicate § SOl(p). Similarly, this Article will not specifically address the 
support of possible terrorist organizations or activities. 
6. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg et ai., Tax-Exempt Funds Aiding Settlements in West 
Bank, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2010, at AI; Josh Nathan-Kazis, Can Tax-Free Donations Fund 
Settlements?, FORWARD.COM (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.forward.com/articles/122779/. 
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have been intermittently suspended,1 the Israeli government and 
certain "religious nationalist organizations" continued development 
in East Jerusalem, which appears to be contrary to current U.S. 
foreign policy under the Obama administration.s In the decade 
ending in 2010, over $200 million in tax-deductible contributions were 
made to domestic charitable organizations that in turn support Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.9 The donations 
primarily fund schools, synagogues, and community centers, which 
likely further the domestic charities' tax-exempt purposes. 10 
Nonetheless, these donations contravene the U.S. policy of 
prohibiting financial aid from the U.S. government to fund these 
Israeli settlements. ll Furthermore, these tax-deductible donations 
arguably infringe on the United States's two-state solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflictY Finally, the continued support and 
development of West Bank settlements violates the established, 
decade-old official policy of the State of IsraeL 13 
Charitable organizations' involvement in these international 
activities has not escaped the notice of the IRS, which announced 
recently that it will pursue charities that "launder tax-exempt U.S. 
donations into illegal Israeli West Bank settlement activities."14 The 
IRS has further announced that it is preparing guidance that will 
address charities and international activities, but the guidance to date 
7. Rutenberg et ai., supra note 6. But see Obama Administration Drops Demand for 
Israeli Settlement Freeze, FoxNEWS.COM (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
politics/2010/12/07/officials-drops-demand-settlement-freeze/. 
8. Nathan-Kazis, supra note 6. 
9. See Rutenberg et al., supra note 6. 
10. See id. 
11. See Amanda Berman, Isn't It Ironic? The Undermining of American Public Policy 
by American Tax Law, and the Ramifications on Middle East Peace, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. 
POL'y & ETHICS J. 81, 109-10 (2011) ("In a May 2011 speech at the State Department ... 
President [Obama] said that the United States believes that negotiations should result in 
two states, with permanent ... borders ... based on the 1967 lines .... " (citations 
omitted»; Margaret A. Weirich, Hijacking the Charitable System: An Examination of Tax-
Exempt Status for Charities that Support Israeli Settlements, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
327,353 (2010); Rutenberg et ai., supra note 6. 
12. See Berman, supra note 11, at 109-10 (noting that President Obama announced 
that the borders before the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, with some adjustments that account for 
Israeli West Bank settlements, should serve as the foundation for a peace agreement 
between the two countries). 
13. See id. at 115 ("Israel's consistent public policy since the Labor Party took control 
of the Knesset (Israeli legislature) in 1995 denies funding for outposts and contributions to 
groups devoted exclusively to settlement-building, and staunchly opposes any new 
construction in disputed West Bank territory."). 
14. IRS Commissioner Says Service Will Pursue Charities Laundering Money to Aid 
West Bank, DAILY TAX REr. (BNA) No. 12,at G-8 (Jan. 1, 2010). 
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appears to focus more on large exempt organizations with overseas 
operations and foreign bank accounts. 15 With both of these 
announcements as a backdrop, in late August 2010, a pro-Israel, 
nonprofit educational organization went public about its struggle with 
the IRS to obtain tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3).16 The 
organization, Z Street, filed a complaint in federal district court in 
Pennsylvania alleging that the IRS has adopted a procedure that 
specifically targets organizations with policies regarding Israel that 
oppose those of the Obama administrationY More specifically, the 
lawsuit alleged that a named IRS agent informed Z Street's counsel 
of two concerns regarding the organization's application for 
exemption: "(1) the advocacy activities in general, and (2) the IRS's 
special concern about applications from organizations whose 
activities are related to Israel, and that are organizations whose 
positions contradict the US Administration's Israeli policy. "18 
The IRS agent further informed the organization's counsel that 
applications of such Israel-related organizations have been assigned 
to "a special unit in the D.C. office to determine whether the 
organization's activities contradict the Administration's public 
policies."19 Z Street sought both (1) a declaration that the IRS's 
current "policy" with respect to Israel-related organizations violates 
the organization's First Amendment free speech rights; and (2) 
injunctive relief barring the IRS from applying a "special policy" with 
15. IRS, IRS TAX EXEMPT & Gov'T ENTITIES, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT & 2012 WORKPLAN 9 (2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/ 
fy2012_eo_work_plan_201Cannrpt.pdf; see also Fred Stokeld, IRS Addressing Issues 
Involving EOs' International Activities, Official Says, 65 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 218 
(Mar. 2010) (quoting an IRS official as saying that the IRS is "working on a publication 
that will address nonprofits and international activities"). 
16. See Complaint at 1, Z Street v. IRS Comm'r, No. 2:10-cv-04307-CMR (E.D. Pa., 
Aug. 25, 2010), 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 3230, at *1, available at http:// 
www.zstreet.orglindex.php?option=com30ntent&view=article&id=96:z-street-v-irs-
commissioner&catid=5:must-read&Itemid=30. All "section" references are to the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless otherwise indicated. 
17. See M. 
18. Id. at 5, 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 3230, at *9. 
19. Id. at 1, 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 3230, at *1. In an affidavit, Jon 
Waddell, manager of the IRS's Exempt Organizations Determinations Group, denied that 
Z Street's application was referred to his "Touch and Go" or "TAG" group because of an 
"Israel Special Policy" or because Z Street's viewpoints on Israel contradicted those 
espoused by the Obama administration. Affidavit of Jon Waddell at 1, 6-7, Z Street v. IRS 
Comm'r, No. 2:1O-cv-04307-CMR (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2010), available at http:// 
www.zstreet.orglindex.php?option=com_content&view';article&id=251 %3Aaffidavit-of-
irs-official-in-charge-of-qtagq-group&catid= 1&1 temid=42. 
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respect to its application for tax-exempt status and directing the IRS 
to disclose fully such policy.20 
In a February 13, 2012, order, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that Z Street's 
controversy was "best construed" as one arising out of § 7428, which 
provides declaratory judgment relief with respect to IRS inaction or 
an adverse determination pertaining to § 501(c)(3) applicants.21 The 
court ordered that the case be transferred to the District Court for the 
District of Columbia.22 In a footnote, the issuing judge stated, "The 
Court shares Plaintiff's view that this is a case about constitutionally 
valid process," responding to Z Street's contention that the 
"substance and application of the Israel Special Policy ... constitutes 
discrimination among viewpoints and a violation of the Plaintiff's 
right to freedom of speech" under the First Amendment.23 Although 
Z Street has argued that the true essence of its case-constitutionally 
protected speech and viewpoints-has eluded tax "experts,,,24 those 
experts have actually probed for answers to questions that could be 
very impactful in the long-term development of tax-exemption law: 
Why did the IRS delay on Z Street's application? What is the 
underlying reason or reasons for the Agency's purported "Israel 
Special Policy" and review unit? Is there a public policy issue lurking 
behind the IRS's actions?25 Until the District Court for the District of 
20. Complaint, supra note 16, at 1-2,2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 3230, at *1-
2. The government filed a motion to dismiss Z Street's complaint. Memorandum in 
Support of United States' Motion to Dismiss, Z Street v. IRS Comm'r, No. 2:1O-cv-04307-
CMR (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2010), available at http://www.zstreet.org/index.php?option 
=com_content&view=article&id=138&Itemid=41. Z Street filed a memorandum in 
opposition to the government's motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of 
United States' Motion to Dismiss, Z Street v. IRS Comm'r, No. 2:1O-cv-04307-CMR (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://www.zstreet.org/index.php?option 
=com_content&view=article&id=216:z-sts-opposition-to-governments-motion-to-dismiss-
the-complaint&catid=l. 
21. Z Street v. IRS Comm'r, No. 2:1O-cv-04307-CMR (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.zstreet.orglindex.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=591: 
federal-court-recognizes-z-street-has-raised-constitutional-c1aim-against-irs&catid= 
5&ltemid=30. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at n.l. 
24. See Major Development in Z ST v. IRS case, Z STREET, 
http://www.zstreet.orglindex.php?option=coffi_content&view=artic1e&id=140&Itemid=39 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2012) ("And [the case] is not, as the IRS claimed and several tax 
"experts" have opined, a claim merely seeking a tax exemption or complaining that the 
IRS has taken too long to make a decision."). 
25. "Public policy issue" refers to the public policy doctrine as enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 595 
(1983). See infra notes 62-83 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
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Columbia rules on the merits of the organization's complaint, legal 
commentators can only speculate. In the interim, Z Street's 
exemption dispute raises the specter that the IRS views U.S. foreign 
policy as impactful on a domestic organization's tax-exempt status-a 
potentially significant development that may have far-reaching 
consequences for domestic tax-exempt organizations participating in 
international activities. 
That specter has fueled certain activist groups to solicit IRS 
involvement with respect to domestic charities that violate U.S. 
foreign policy or engage in activities abroad that would be legally 
problematic in the United States.26 One such group, Stop the JNF 
Campaign, is demanding that the IRS revoke the exemption of the 
Jewish National Fund ("JNF") because the JNF allegedly "funds 
activities in Israel and the Occupied West Bank that are both 
contrary to the public policy of the United States and inconsistent 
with activities of a charitable or environmental organization. "27 The 
Campaign further alleges that the JNF has "discriminatory land-use 
restrictions" that bar native Palestinians from leasing or otherwise 
inhabiting JNF land in Israel. 28 Examples of potentially problematic 
26. The IRS's 2012 work plan included guidance on the international activities of 
domestic charitable organizations, but the focus is primarily on "whether assets of exempt 
organizations that are dedicated for charitable purposes internationally are being diverted 
for non-charitable purposes .... " Diane Freda, Political, International Activity Get New 
Focus Under fRS's Exempt Organization Work Plan, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 26, at 
G-7 (Feb. 9, 2012). The IRS is most concerned with whether the international operations 
of domestic charitable organizations are consistent with such organizations' charitable 
purposes. See id. The 2013 work plan similarly focuses on excessive private benefit and 
insufficient charitable activity in the context of foreign grants and activities. See IRS, IRS 
TAX EXEMPT & GOV'T ENTITIES, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 2012 ANNUAL REPORT & 
2013 WORKPLAN 19 (2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/ 
FY2012_EO_AnnuaIRpC2013_ Work_Plan. pdf. 
27. STOP THE JNF CAMPAIGN, http://www.stopthejnf.org/ 
unitedstates_takeaction_irsletter.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2012); see also Josh Nathan-
Kazis, JNF Challenged on Discrimination, FORWARD.COM (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www. 
forward.com/articles/1371871 (noting that the Campaign also refers to JNF's policies 
prohibiting the sale of land to Palestinians as "discriminatory"). 
28. STOP THE JNF CAMPAIGN, supra note 27. In March 2011, the State Department 
released its "2009 Human Rights Report: Israel and the Occupied Territories." U.S. 
DEP'T. OF STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rlslhrrpt/2oo9/nea/136070.htm 
("Approximately 93 percent of land [in Israel] was in the public domain, and the Jewish 
National Fund (JNF), whose statutes prohibit sale or lease of land to non-Jews, owned 
approximately 12.5 percent. In 2005 the attorney general ruled the [Israeli] government 
cannot discriminate against Arab citizens of Israel in marketing and allocating lands it 
manages, including those of the JNF. As an interim measure, the government agreed 
through the Israel Lands Administration (ILA) to compensate the JNF for any land leased 
to an Arab by transferring an equal amount of land from the ILA to the JNF."). 
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international activities are not just limited to U.S. foreign policy with 
respect to Israel. Purportedly, American charities supported the Irish 
Republican Army's armed conflict with the British government in 
contravention of U.S. foreign policy at the time.29 In addition, any 
charity that funds or otherwise supports activities abroad could find 
that such funding or support violates U.S. foreign policy, public 
policy, or law, including international law,30 such as exploitation of 
child labor, racial discrimination in education, or denial of voting 
rights to women. All of these examples raise the issue introduced 
above: whether a domestic charity's international activities can or 
should impact its charitable exemption under U.S.law. 
As previously stated, current federal income tax law does not 
explicitly prohibit charitable organizations from channeling donated 
funds in support of international organizations or activities that 
violate current U.S. foreign policy or internationallaw.31 The IRS has 
recently stated: "Proper control and discretion over use of funds is 
required when U.S. charities are making grants to foreign charities 
.... U.S. charities operating abroad must adhere to the same .. . 
501(c)(3) rules as charities operating in the United States .... "32 
However, in making that comment, the IRS only referenced the 
private benefit, private inurement, lobbying, and political campaign 
activity rules,33 none of which are necessarily implicated in the 
situations presented herein.34 Accordingly, the only possible restraint 
on this type of international support exists in the public policy 
doctrine enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Bob 
Jones University v. United States,35 which granted the Treasury 
Department (and the IRS by delegation) the power to revoke the tax-
exempt status of an organization whose purpose violates "established 
public policy."36 
29. See Kevin Cullen, America and the Conflict, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/iralreports/america.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
30. See infra notes 143-60 and accompanying text for additional discussion on how 
international law can be considered U.S. domestic law, thereby potentially impacting a 
charitable organization's tax-exempt status. 
31. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
32. Diane Freda, Control Is Needed over Use of Funds in Foreign Granting-Making 
Arena, IRS Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 151, at G-5 (Aug. 5, 2012). 
33. See infra notes 43, 55-59, and accompanying text for additional discussion of these 
rules. 
34. As discussed above, the IRS has yet to direct specific attention to the issues 
discussed in this Article. See supra note 26 
35. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
36. [d. at 586; see also Mirkay, supra note 2, at 51 (discussing Bob Jones). 
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The IRS, however, has only used the doctrine to revoke tax-
exempt status in instances where the organizations participated in 
racial discrimination in education, advocated civil disobedience, or 
were involved in an illegal activity.37 Despite its merits, the doctrine's 
main failure is its lack of a clearly defined source of "established 
public policy." And, the doctrine becomes even more complicated 
when U.S. foreign policy is potentially included under the scope of 
"established public policy."38 Additionally, legal scholars have 
routinely raised another concern-whether the public policy doctrine 
places too much discretion in the IRS, a regulatory agency.39 
Accordingly, this Article wrestles with whether charitable 
organizations' international activities can or should impact such 
organizations' domestic tax exemption. Should a domestic charity's 
financial support of international activities that violate current U.S. 
foreign policy adversely affect that charity's tax-exempt status? How 
does a domestic charity comply with the myriad of international laws 
that may be implicated by their activities abroad? Does the 
contravention of U.S. foreign policy or international law implicate the 
public policy doctrine enunciated in Bob Jones University? On one 
hand, this Article agrees with other legal scholars that the public 
policy doctrine needs congressional attention, including some 
codification of the doctrine to provide legislative boundaries and 
ensure against arbitrary and capricious application by the IRS.40 On 
the other hand, this Article contends that the automatic inclusion of 
U.S. foreign policy and international law as components of 
"established public policy" would be administratively impracticable 
and onerous and would result in significant compliance difficulties for 
charitable organizations. Particularly, U.S. foreign policy should not 
be deemed "established public policy" because foreign policy 
37. See Mirkay, supra note 2, at 51; see also David A. Brennen, The Power of the 
Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Policy and "Charity" in Contemporary Society, 33 
u.e. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 391 n.2 (2000) ("We believe that engaging in conduct or 
arrangements that violate the anti-kickback statute is inconsistent with continued 
exemption as a charitable hospital."). 
38. Mirkay, supra note 2, at 51, 67; see also Brennen, supra note 37, at 403-04,407, 
436-39 (raising the fundamental issue of which sources of law or current policy the IRS 
should consult to determine that a national public policy exists). 
39. See, e.g., David A. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice, and Civil Rights: 
Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights Laws to Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 BYU L. 
REV. 167, 186-87; Brennen, supra note 37, at 411-28, 446; Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming 
the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397,407-08 (2005); Charles O. Galvin & 
Neal Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States, 36 V AND. L. 
REV. 1353, 1372-73 (1983). 
40. See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 39, at 468-77. 
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routinely lacks clarity and definition-a central tenet of foreign policy 
is the deference given to the President, a post that may change every 
four years. Similarly, the mere difficulty in defining what constitutes 
international law reveals the initial complication in integrating this 
area of law into domestic tax exemption law. 
Part I of this Article provides a statutory and regulatory 
framework, including a discussion of the public policy doctrine. It 
scrutinizes the failure of the existing framework and the public policy 
doctrine to address potential conflicts between charitable 
organizations' international activities and U.S. foreign policy or 
international law. Part II further examines the definitional and 
compliance challenges associated with mandating that U.S. foreign 
policy and international law constitute "established public policy" for 
purposes of the doctrine. Considering all these definitional 
challenges, this Article nevertheless proposes in Part III that some 
codification of the public policy doctrine accompanied by a listed 
transaction scheme, similar to those employed in other areas of the 
Code,41 could provide Congress and ultimately the IRS with the 
ability to target certain international activities as inherently in conflict 
with tax-exempt status. In addition, this Article proposes that the 
codification of the public policy doctrine should include an excise tax 
regime to address isolated or small violations of the public policy 
doctrine in relation to a charitable organization's overall tax-exempt 
activities. Particularly, such an excise tax regime would serve as an 
alternative to revocation in such instances. Although these proposals 
are not without pitfalls and criticisms, they will nevertheless provide 
practical guidance to charitable organizations, thereby aiding 
compliance and ensuring uniform treatment of charitable 
organizations with international activities or operations. 
I. THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPACf ON CHARITABLE EXEMPTION 
A. Overview of the Federal Income Tax Exemption42 
In order to discuss the potential limitations on, and effect of, 
charitable organizations engaging in international activities, a brief 
overview of the exemption statute and the regulatory tests that must 
be satisfied before the IRS grants an exemption is necessary. 
41. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text. 
42. Portions of the discussion in this subpart are substantially similar to a 
corresponding portion contained in Mirkay, supra note 2, at 54-56. 
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Section 501(c)(3) provides for the federal income-tax exemption of 
nonprofit corporations and certain other entities 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific .. , or educational purposes ... no part of the net 
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of 
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to 
influence legislation ... and which does not participate in, or 
intervene in ... any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office.43 
IRS regulations and rulings define the meaning of each of the 
eight specific exempt purposes listed in the statute (for example, 
religious, charitable,44 and educational).45 Section 501 (c)(3) 
establishes both an organizational test and an operational test for 
determining whether an organization fulfills its exempt purposes;46 to 
qualify for exemption, an organization must meet both tests.47 The 
organizational test relates solely to the language used in the 
organization's governing documents.48 An organization meets the 
requirements of the test if it was organized exclusively for at least one 
tax-exempt, charitable purpose.49 This is possible only if the 
organizing document (1) limits the organization's purpose to one or 
more exempt purposes, and (2) does not expressly empower it to 
substantially engage in activities that do not further any exempt 
43. 1.R.c. § 501(c)(3) (2006). Specifically, § 501(a) provides that "[a]n organization 
described in subsection (c) or (d) ... shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle." [d. 
§ 501(a). 
44. See Mirkay, supra note 2, at 56-60 and infra note 80 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the meaning of "charitable" under § 501(c)(3) and the common practice of 
collectively referring to the entities listed in the statute as "charitable." In addition, the 
IRS has determined that other qualifying purposes meet the overall public-benefit 
principle of § 501(c)(3) based on an expansive interpretation of "charitable." See Brennen, 
supra note 39, at 178. 
45. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d) (as amended in 2008) (religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, or prevention of cruelty to 
children or animals). § 501(c)(3) lists as an eighth exempt purpose "to foster national or 
international amateur sports competition," which is not addressed by any regulation. 
LR.C. § 501(c)(3). 
46. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
47. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1). 
48. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i). 
49. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1). 
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purposes. 50 The organizational test also imposes requirements on the 
distribution of the organization's assets upon dissolution. 51 
The issues that this Article focuses on most likely implicate the 
operational test. The purpose of the operational test is to ensure that 
an exempt organization's resources and activities are devoted 
primarily to its exempt purposes. The regulations break down the 
operational test into two components: (1) the primary-purpose-or-
activity test and (2) the private-inurement prohibition. 52 Under the 
primary-purpose-or-activity test, "[aJn organization will be regarded 
as operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes only if it 
engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such 
exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3)."53 An organization 
will not pass this test if "more than an insubstantial part of its 
activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose."54 
Under the private-inurement prohibition, an organization will 
not satisfy the operational test "if its net earnings inure in whole or in 
part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals."55 The 
regulations define the term "private shareholder or individual" as 
"persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the 
organization"56 such as officers, directors, or other individuals in a 
position to assert influence or control over the organization's 
operations and activities. 57 The prohibition is absolute-any amount 
of inurement is impermissible. 58 Organizations exempt under 
§ 501(c)(3) are also subject to other limitations with respect to their 
operations, including the private-benefit doctrine. 59 
50. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i). 
51. See id. § l.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4). The IRS typically implements this regulation by 
requiring an organization, either in its governing document or under relevant state law, to 
explicitly dedicate its assets to one or more exempt purposes in the event of dissolution. 
Id. 
52. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) to (2). 
53. [d. § 1.501{c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2). 
56. /d. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (as amended in 1982); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, 
1991 WL 776308, at *7 (Nov. 22, 1991) ("The proscription against inurement generally 
applies to ... persons who, because of their particular relationship with an organization, 
have an opportunity to control or influence its activities."). 
57. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 20.3, at 510 
(10th ed. 2011). 
58. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2). 
59. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). For further discussion on the private-benefit 
doctrine and other operational restrictions, see Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! 
Why the IRS Should Change Its Stance on Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint 
Ventures, 6 NEV. L.l. 21, 30-34 (2005). 
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B. The Public Policy Doctrine 
As previously mentioned, the Court's decision in Bob Jones 
University imposes the additional, nonstatutory public policy doctrine 
on an organization seeking tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3).60 By 
failing to articulate a clearly defined source of "established public 
policy," courts have left the doctrine open to the IRS's unfettered 
discretion,61 which may allow for the arbitrary or even discriminatory 
treatment of proposed entities on the ill-defined basis of "public 
policy." 
1. Overview-Bob Jones University v. United States62 
The controversy that culminated in the Supreme Court's decision 
in Bob Jones University began in early 1970 when a federal district 
court issued a preliminary injunction compelling the IRS to deny tax 
exemption to Mississippi private schools with racially discriminatory 
admissions policies.63 Until that time, the IRS granted tax-exempt 
status to private schools regardless of any racially discriminatory 
admissions policy.64 In response to the injunction, the IRS 
discontinued granting exemptions in such instances and also began 
prohibiting deductions for charitable contributions to schools acting 
in a racially discriminatory manner.65 The IRS notified private schools 
of this new policy by means of a press release and a letter. 66 In 
addition, it issued a revenue ruling formally establishing this new 
policy, requiring these schools to adopt and maintain a policy of 
nondiscrimination with respect to students in their admissions 
60. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1983). 
61. See Brennen, supra note 39, at 178 & n.48. 
62. The discussion in this subpart is a modified version of the discussion contained in 
Mirkay, supra note 2, at 61-65. 
63. See Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127,1140 (D.D.C. 1970); see also Galvin & 
Devins, supra note 39, at 1357 ("The Green court suggested that the IRS would not be 
permitted to grant tax-exempt status to institutions that violate the government's public 
policy of nondiscrimination."). One year later, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia permanently enjoined the IRS from granting tax-exempt status to 
any Mississippi school that failed to publicly sustain a nondiscrimination policy. See Green 
v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150,1179-80 (D.D.C. 1971), affd memo sub nom. Coit V. Green, 
404 U.S. 997 (1971). 
64. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577. 
65. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 c.B. 230; see also Brennen, supra note 37, at 400-01 
("In response to the preliminary injunction, the IRS issued a news release indicating that it 
could not 'legally justify' granting charitable status to private schools that racially 
discriminate, nor could it allow tax deductions for contributions to such schools."). 
66. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 578; Brennen, supra note 37, at 401. 
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processes, scholarship and loan programs, and school-administered 
programs (like athletics).67 
Upon receiving formal notification from the IRS of the new 
nondiscrimination requirement for private schools, Bob Jones 
University first filed suit in 1971 in an attempt to enjoin the IRS from 
revoking its tax exemption.68 On January 19, 1976, the IRS revoked 
the University's charitable exemption retroactive to the day after the 
date on which the University received the notification letter regarding 
the IRS's change in policy for private schools. 69 As a vehicle for 
challenging the revocation of its exemption, the University filed suit 
in federal district court seeking a refund of the federal unemployment 
tax it paid to the IRS for the year 1975.70 The government 
counterclaimed for unpaid taxes.71 
The district court determined that the revocation of the 
University's exempt status exceeded the IRS's delegated powers and 
violated the University's First Amendment religious rights. 72 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
district court decision on appeal, stating that an educational 
institution must be "charitable in the broad common law sense, and 
. .. therefore must not violate public policy" to be eligible for 
67. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. at 230-31. In explaining the basis for the ruling, 
the IRS stated the following: 
Under common law, the term "charity" encompasses all three of the major 
categories identified separately under section 501(c)(3) of the Code as religious, 
educational, and charitable. Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service 
have long recognized that the statutory requirement of being "organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, *** or educational purposes" was 
intended to express the basic common law concept. Thus, a school asserting a right 
to the benefits provided for in section 501(c)(3) of the Code as being organized 
and operated exclusively for educational purposes must be a common law charity 
in order to be exempt under that section. 
!d. at 230. In concluding that a school without a racially nondiscriminatory policy with 
respect to students is not "charitable," the IRS relies on the charitable-trust principle that 
"the purpose of the trust may not be illegal or contrary to public policy." [d. The IRS 
subsequently released guidelines for determining whether a private school has adequately 
publicized its racially nondiscriminatory policy. See Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587, 587-
90; Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834. 
68. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581. 
69. See id. at 581. 
70. See id. at 581-82. 
71. See id. 
72. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 906 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 
639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir.1980), affd, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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exemption.73 Furthermore, the court of appeals determined that the 
University failed this requirement because its "racial policies violated 
the clearly defined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, 
condemning racial discrimination and, more specifically, the 
government policy against subsidizing racial discrimination in 
education, public or private. "74 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision by a 
vote of eight to one. 75 The Court noted that in order to qualify for 
exempt status under § 501(c)(3), an organization must (1) fall within 
one of eight categories set forth in the statute and (2) demonstrate 
that its activities are not contrary to "established public policy."76 In 
opting for a broader concept of charity, the Court rejected the 
University's argument that the eight categories are disjunctive and, 
therefore, an organization need not also qualify as "charitable" to be 
tax-exempt.77 The Court observed that although § 501(c)(3) does not 
explicitly impose a public-policy limitation, Congress nevertheless 
intended that "entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting 
certain common law standards of charity-namely, that an institution 
... must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established 
public policy."78 
The Court further observed the interaction between § 170 and 
§ 501(c)(3), explaining that in enacting both sections, "Congress 
sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to 
encourage the development of private institutions that serve a useful 
public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions 
of the same kind."79 Accordingly, the Bob Jones University decision 
solidified the view that there is a "charitable" overlay to all exempt 
organizations described in § 501(c)(3), and thereby provided the 
means necessary to impose a public-policy limitation. 80 
73. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1980) (citations 
omitted), affd, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 582. 
74. Bob Jones Univ., 639 F.2d at 151. 
75. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 576. 
76. See id. at 585. 
77. See id. at 585-86. 
78. {d. at 586. In response to the University's "plain language" argument that 
§ 501(c)(3) was devoid of any "charitable" overlay to all of the purposes delineated 
therein, the Court stated, "It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that a 
court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would 
defeat the plain purpose of the statute .... " Id. 
79. Id. at 588. 
80. Cf Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints on Charitable Organizations, 3 VA. 
TAX REV. 291,292 (1984) ("[T]he Supreme Court has misread the common law of charity 
into the Code while confusing the public policy and public benefit strands of charitable 
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To support its conclusion that Bob Jones University violated an 
"established public policy" and, thus, could not be considered 
charitable, the United States Supreme Court stated that "[a]n 
unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of Education 
establishes beyond doubt this Court's view that racial discrimination 
in education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as 
well as rights of individuals."81 In addition to Brown, the Court relied 
on the Civil Rights Acts, as well as executive orders issued over a 
forty-year period, to conclude that eliminating racial discrimination in 
education was an established national public policy.82 Ultimately, the 
Court relied on the aggregated pronouncements of all three branches 
of government as constituting "established public policy."83 
In response to the University's argument that the public-policy 
doctrine violated its First Amendment free exercise rights, the Court 
affirmed that certain compelling governmental interests can justify 
regulating certain religiously based conduct.84 In finding that the 
government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education 
was sufficiently compelling to overcome any First Amendment 
concerns, the Court concluded that the "[d]enial of tax benefits will 
inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of private 
religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from observing 
their religious tenets."85 
trust law."). As the lone dissenter in Bob Jones University, Justice Rehnquist rejected the 
notion that there existed a charitable overlay to each of the delineated purposes in 
§ 501(c)(3). Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 615 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He concluded 
that "the legislative history of § 501(c)(3) unmistakably makes clear that Congress has 
decided what organizations are serving a public purpose and providing a public benefit 
within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) and has clearly set forth in § 501(c)(3) the characteristics 
of such organizations." Id.; see also Galvin & Devins, supra note 39, at 1363 ("Justice 
Rehnquist ... endorsed the University'S argument that the legislative history militated 
against a finding that section 501(c)(3) required common law charitability."). 
81. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 374 U.S. 483 
(1954». 
82. See id. at 593-95; Brennen, supra note 37, at 403"()4. 
83. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 598. 
84. See id. at 603. The Court relied, in part, on Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
(1944), summarizing its holding that "neutrally cast child labor laws prohibiting sale of 
printed materials on public streets could be applied to prohibit children from dispensing 
religious literature." Id. at 603. 
85. Id. at 603-04. The Court further concluded that the government's interest 
"substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' 
exercise of their religious beliefs. The interests asserted by petitioners cannot be 
accommodated with that compelling governmental interest ... and no 'less restrictive 
means' ... are available to achieve the governmental interest." Id. at 604 (citations 
omitted). 
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2. Criticism of the Public Policy Doctrine 
Although the Court in Bob Jones University reached the correct 
result, it has nevertheless sparked extensive scholarly deliberation 
and criticism over the last thirty years. Critics have disparaged the 
Court for concluding that a charitable overlay to § 501(c)(3) exists 
and for imposing a public-policy limitation on the exemption 
statute.86 They likewise have rebuked the Court for "abdicat[ing] its 
supervisory powers to the IRS" and "supplant[ing] the role of 
Congress as lawmaker by making broad tax policy pronouncements," 
rather than exercising the necessary oversight to ensure that the IRS 
properly enforces the tax laws.87 
Legal scholars have criticized the doctrine as lacking legal or 
statutory authority and a "clearly defined scope of applicability."88 
Since the IRS's adoption of its racial nondiscrimination policy in 
1970, Congress has neither enacted any law that codifies the public 
policy doctrine89 nor provided the IRS with statutory authority to 
solely determine public policy and act thereon. 9O As a consequence, 
some scholars have questioned whether the IRS is the appropriate 
federal agency to determine if a charitable organization violates an 
"established public policy."91 In his concurrence in Bob Jones 
University, Justice Powell appeared to agree. To support his assertion 
that this task belongs to Congress, Justice Powell quoted Justice 
Blackmun's dissent in a prior Supreme Court decision: 
[W]here the philanthropic organization is concerned, there 
appears to be little to circumscribe the almost unfettered power 
86. See, e.g., Galston, supra note SO, at 292 ("[T]he Supreme Court has misread the 
common law of charity into the Code while confusing the public policy and public benefit 
strands of charitable trust law."); Galvin & Devins, supra note 39, at 1379-80 ("[T]he 
Court went too far in interposing into the Code its own standards of 'common community 
conscience' and 'public purpose.' "). 
87. Galvin & Devins, supra note 39, at 1379. 
88. Brennen, supra note 39, at 186; see also Buckles, supra note 39, at 407 ("[T]he IRS 
(like the Court) has not disclosed its understanding (if any) of the precise contours of the 
doctrine. "). 
89. See Brennen, supra note 39, at 186 & n.83. 
90. See Brennen, supra note 37, at 446; Brennen, supra note 39, at 187; Galvin & 
Devins, supra note 39, at 1379. Congress did, however, enact § 501(i) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which prohibits discrimination by certain social clubs. See LR.C. § 501(i) 
(2006). Justice Rehnquist referred to the existence of § 501(i) in his Bob Jones University 
dissent as evidence that if Congress "wants to add a requirement prohibiting racial 
discrimination to one of the tax-benefit provisions, it is fully aware of how to do it." Bob 
Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 621 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
91. See Brennen, supra note 37, at 426-27; Buckles, supra note 39, at 462 (stating that 
the doctrine "vests extremely broad discretion in nonlegislative bodies to decide whether 
charitable entities are entitled to federal income tax exemption"). 
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of the Commissioner [of Internal Revenue]. This may be very 
well so long as one subscribes to the particular brand of social 
policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating at the time 
. .. but application of our tax laws should not operate in so 
fickle a fashion. Surely, social policy in the first instance is a 
matter for legislative concern.92 
One scholar, Professor David Brennen, has argued that this lack 
of existing legal authority forced the Bob Jones University Court to 
rely on an expansive interpretation of "charitable" in § 501(c)(3) as 
justification for the IRS's public policy power.93 In disagreeing with 
such an expansive view of "charitable," Brennen concludes that the 
Court's decision failed to "address the limits of the Treasury's ability 
to determine when or if a particular 'public policy' is sufficiently 
'established' in any context other than whites discriminating against 
blacks."94 Accordingly, Brennen and other legal scholars have raised 
the fundamental issue of which sources of law or current policy the 
IRS should consult to determine to what extent a national public 
policy does or does not exist. 95 
While the Court looked to all three branches of government to 
conclude that an "established public policy" existed,96 it is unclear 
whether this standard is too restrictive to be applied in all instances or 
if a broader view of public policy should be adopted; in other words, 
it is still unclear whether policy should be "established" without a 
clear consensus from all three governmental branches.97 As discussed 
herein, do foreign policy and international law adopted by the United 
92. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 611-12 (Powell, J. concurring) (quoting Alexander v. 
"Ams. United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1974) (Blackmun, 1., dissenting»; see also 
Galvin & Devins, supra note 39, at 1373 ("Justice Blackmun's observation that too much 
administrative discretion may permit the IRS to administer tax laws in 'so fickle a fashion' 
continues to be a concern because the Internal Revenue Code is so pervasive in its 
application and the opportunity for abuse is so great."); Michael Hatfield et aI., Bob Jones 
University: Defining Violations of Fundamental Public Policy, in 6 TOPICS IN 
PHILANTHROPY 1, 14 (2000), available at http://wwwl.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/pdfs/Monograph/ 
Monograph2000BobJones.pdf ("As both Justices Powell and Rehnquist point out, the 
ultimate balancing of interests belongs in the hands of Congress .... "). 
93. See Brennen, supra note 39, at 186-87. 
94. Brennen, supra note 37, at 407. 
95. See id. at 436-39; Buckles, supra note 39, at 408-32. 
96. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 598. 
97. See HOPKINS, supra note 57, at 163 ("It may also be asserted that there is a federal 
public policy in the tax-exempt organization's context, either presently in existence or in 
the process of development, against other forms of discrimination, such as discrimination 
on the basis of marital status, national origin, religion, handicap, sexual preference, and 
age."). 
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States constitute norms sufficient to establish public policy?98 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether relative norms must exist for a 
period of time in order for a public policy to be "established."99 All of 
these uncertainties with respect to the existence of public policy 
illustrate the significant evidentiary burden placed on the IRS to 
prove that an organization's activities violate a fundamental public 
policy. 100 
Another legal scholar, Professor Johnny Rex Buckles, has raised 
other flaws and inconsistencies with the public policy doctrine, some 
of which are particularly pertinent to this Article's focus. First, 
Buckles points out that in Bob Jones University, the Court "did not 
decide whether an organization's violation of law always results in 
denial (or revocation) of exemption."101 Accordingly, he opines that 
some distinction should be made between ongoing illegal activity and 
mere isolated acts, alluding to a similar distinction made by the IRS in 
a revenue ruling. 102 Buckles cautions against any interpretation of the 
public policy doctrine that would "deny exemption to every 
organization that engages more than insubstantially in illegal 
activities" because some illegal activities, such as prior laws that 
punished demonstrations against racial discrimination, may actually 
result in an "established public policy" (e.g., no racial discrimination 
in voting, the workplace, or education). 103 Buckles ultimately 
98. See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 39, at 426-32 (discussing whether state law norms 
should be considered in determining public policy). 
99. Seeid. at 436-37. 
100. See Hatfield et aI., supra note 92, at 16. Beyond the evidentiary burden, the "IRS 
may also be loathe to jeopardize its own independence. Taking action against an 
organization for violating public policy, the IRS risks being reined in by the Congress or 
the President. Already unpopular, it may seem foolhardy to IRS officials to take a stand 
on controversial political issues." [d. The IRS acknowledges this difficulty in its own 
training materials on the public policy doctrine: "Deciding a case on the basis of public 
policy rather than a specific law is difficult because it requires discerning what the public 
policy involved really is." See JEAN WRIGHT & JAY H. ROTZ, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., ILLEGALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 9 (1993), http://www.irs.gov/ 
publirs-tegefeotopicl94.pdf. 
101. Buckles, supra note 39, at 410. 
102. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204, 205 ("The intentional nature of this 
encouragement [to commit illegal acts] precludes the possibility that the organization 
might unfairly fail to qualify for exemption due to an isolated or inadvertent violation of a 
regulatory statute."); Buckles, supra note 39, at 410-11; cf I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 
34,631, 1971 WL 28756, at *5 (Oct. 4, 1971) ("If an organization carries on substantial 
illegal activities, it cannot qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Code."). 
103. Buckles, supra note 39, at 413; see Johnny Rex Buckles, Do Law Schools Forfeit 
Federal Income Tax Exemption When They Deny Military Recruiters Full Access to Career 
Services Programs?: The Hypothetical Case of Yale University v. Commissioner, 41 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1,24-25 (2009). 
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concludes that the doctrine needs to be "limited and refined" and 
distinguish between "activities and purposes that are constitutionally 
protected and those that are not."I04 
For instance, in Buckles's opinion, the public policy doctrine 
should not be utilized to usurp an organization's free speech, 
associative, and religious free exercise rights, provided that the 
organization otherwise qualifies under § 501(c)(3).I05 Undoubtedly, 
the Z Street exemption dispute, discussed in this Article's 
introduction, would be one such instance where the doctrine should 
have no application due to the free speech implications. In response 
to concerns that application of the public policy doctrine may 
nevertheless fail to violate a constitutionally protected right, Buckles 
aptly phrases his interrogatory as "whether, in the absence of specific 
statutory language, the public policy doctrine should enable the IRS 
or a court to deny (or revoke) an entity's federal income tax 
exemption on account of an activity that is constitutionally protected 
from direct prohibition. "106 
Despite the public policy doctrine's potentially limitless 
application, few scholars advocate scrapping the doctrine 
altogether. to7 For example, Professor Buckles raises "absurd" 
situations that would result if the doctrine were completely 
eliminated, referring to a tax-exempt charitable organization that uses 
illegal actions to accomplish its charitable purpose.108 Ultimately, the 
absence of a clearly defined public policy and other flaws, as 
discussed above, force the IRS to balance its unfettered discretion in 
exercising public policy power with the heavy burden of proving that 
an "established" policy exists. 
104. Buckles, supra note 39, at 468. 
105. See id. at 475. 
106. ld. at 476. 
107. See, e.g., David A. Brennen, Charities and the Constitution: Evaluating the Role of 
Constitutional Principles in Determining the Scope of Tax Law's Public Policy Limitation 
for Charities, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 779, 848-49 (2002); Brennen, supra note 37, at 446; 
Buckles, supra note 39, at 466-67; Galvin & Devins, supra note 39, at 1379-8l. 
108. Professor Buckles hypothesizes: 
For an extreme example, assume that an organization created to promote world 
peace periodically hires sharpshooters to assassinate foreign and domestic military 
leaders perceived to perpetuate hostilities among nations. To assume that 
Congress intended to exempt this organization from federal income taxation 
merely because the promotion of piece is "charitable" and the statute does not 
explicitly prohibit exempt entities from behaving as terrorists is ludicrous. 
Buckles, supra note 39, at 467 (footnote omitted). 
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This difficult balancing act may explain why the IRS has used the 
public policy doctrine as the basis for revocation only in instances 
involving racial discrimination, civil disobedience, or certain illegal 
activity.l09 However, the Z Street exemption dispute raises the 
possibility that the IRS views U.S. foreign policy as public policy, thus 
impacting a domestic organization's tax-exempt status. Once again, 
the lack of a clearly defined public policy leaves charitable 
organizations in the precarious position of monitoring the current 
political climate to ensure that their activities do not violate 
contemporary public policy, including, potentially, current U.S. 
foreign policy or international law yo Finally, the public policy 
doctrine's all-or-nothing application leaves charitable organizations 
that may have isolated or relatively minor public policy infractions 
vulnerable to a revocation of their tax exemption. Therefore, due to 
the increasing issues implicated by domestic charities' international 
activities, it is time for the doctrine to be both clarified and limited in 
its application and impact. 
II. EXAMINING THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCIRINE IN LIGHT OF 
GLOBALIZED PHILANTHROPY 
A. U.S. Foreign Policy-Does It Constitute "Established Public 
Policy"? 
One aspect of the public policy doctrine that needs clarification is 
whether it applies to violations of current or established U.S. foreign 
policy. This Part discusses the difficulty in applying the doctrine to 
foreign policy and demonstrates why such application is problematic 
for domestic charities that operate internationally. Namely, equating 
U.S. foreign policy with "established public policy" would present 
significant administrative challenges and compliance burdens for 
these organizations. 
The fundamental question of whether U.S. foreign policy 
constitutes "established public policy" is one that is not easily 
approachable. For example, is it determinative which branch or 
branches of government are responsible for formulating policy? This 
question, among others, necessitates the following discussion 
regarding which branch or branches of government have the 
109. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
110. See Galvin & Devins, supra note 39, at 1373-74 ("[A]n organization's survival may 
depend on the views of the particular administration in office."). 
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authority for creating and maintaining foreign policy under the 
Constitution. 
The Constitution divides responsibility for foreign policy among 
the executive and legislative branches; each serves important roles 
that differ and intersect. The Constitution is distinctly limited in its 
direction on foreign policy matters-it grants certain powers to the 
President, certain powers to the Senate, and other powers to 
Congress. 111 The President's enumerated powers are to: (1) make 
treaties with the "advice and consent of the Senate";1l2 (2) nominate 
and, "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," appoint 
ambassadors;ll3 and (3) receive foreign ambassadorsY4 The President 
also has considerable implied and unenumerated power arising from 
the "executive power" granted to him by Article n.m Alexander 
Hamilton, among others, argued eady on that this power "expressly 
conferred upon [the President] all authority over foreign relations, 
subject to only a few explicit exceptions."1l6 Thomas Jefferson agreed 
that "[t]he transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive 
altogether."l17 Congress's enumerated powers are to: (1) regulate 
commerce with foreign nations; (2) define and punish piracy and 
felonies on the high seas; (3) declare war; and (4) establish rules on 
naturalization. l1S Congress's general, unenumerated powers are 
"indispensable to the conduct of foreign relations," including the 
power to tax and spend for the "common defense and general 
welfare." 119 
It is unsettled whether the executive or legislative branch 
"originates or finally determines" foreign policy. 120 This 
determination is not easily reached for several reasons. First, foreign 
policy is not "created in a vacuum as some sort of indivisible whole 
with a single grand design" but rather encompasses a protracted 
course comprised of numerous players and policies towards different 
111. RICHARD F. GRIMMElT, DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN POLICY ROLES OF THE 
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS (1999), http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm. 
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
113. Jd. 
114. Jd. § 3; see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 35-37 (2d ed. 1996). 
115. See HENKIN, supra note 114, at 39. Article II, Section 1 of the Federal 
Constitution provides: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
116. HENKIN, supra note 114, at 39. 
117. {d. at39&n.11. 
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3, 4,10,11; see HENKIN, supra note 114, at 6~4. 
119. HENKIN, supra note 114, at 64. 
120. GRIMMElT, supra note 111. 
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countries and regions. 121 Second, due to this complex interaction of 
players and policies it is extremely difficult to conclude the person or 
persons that should be "credited with initiating or altering" any 
specific foreign policy. 122 Finally, "the roles and relative influence of 
the two branches in making foreign policy differ" occasionally based 
on such factors as the personalities and the political party affiliations 
of the President and members of Congress and the "degree of 
consensus on policy."123 For example, for decades leading up to the 
Vietnam War, the executive branch was the primary initiator of 
foreign policy.124 After Vietnam, however, Congress "reasserted" its 
foreign policy role.125 Notwithstanding, one study concluded that 
although Congress has more influence on foreign affairs than in most 
other countries, "the fact remains that the President is still in charge 
of American foreign policy."126 
One commentator has looked at the foreign policy roles of the 
President and Congress and the ways in which the executive branch 
and legislative branch can "originate or initially shape foreign 
policy."127 As to the President, there are six basic ways to create 
foreign policy, placing Congress in the position of either "responding 
positively to the President's initiative or seeking to adjust or reverse 
the impact of his position."128 They are: (1) responding to foreign 
events (e.g., United States military actions in support of United 
Nations operations); (2) proposing legislation (e.g., foreign assistance 
programs); (3) negotiating international agreements (sometimes 
referred to as "executive agreements");129 (4) issuing statements on 
U.S. foreign policy; (5) implementing foreign policy legislation 
enacted by Congress; and (6) taking independent action. 130 
As to Congress, the commentator determined there are six basic 
ways in which the legislative body creates foreign policy, placing the 
executive branch in the position of either "responding positively to 
the congressional initiative or seeking to adjust or reverse the impact 
121. !d. 
122. ld. 
123. ld. 
124. See id. 
125. ld. 
126. ld. 
127. ld. 
128. ld. 
129. See infra note 152-55 and accompanying text for further discussion of executive 
agreements. 
130. See GRIMMETI,supra note 111. 
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of his position."131 They are: (1) introducing and adopting resolutions 
and policy statements; (2) enacting legislation establishing a new 
foreign program, subject to the President's ultimate approval and 
implementation; (3) applying pressure on the executive branch by 
threatening to enact certain legislation; (4) placing legislation 
prohibitions or restrictions on the President's ability to act in foreign 
affairs (e.g., funding restrictions or legislation prohibiting certain 
actions); (5) providing informal advice to the executive branch; and 
(6) providing oversight over executive branch implementation of 
foreign policy (e.g., hearings and investigations). 132 One notable 
example of foreign policy articulated through legislation is the joint 
resolution of Congress in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks, which President George W. Bush signed into law.133 On 
September 18, 2001, Congress authorized the President 
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, 
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons. 134 
This resolution served as authority for President Bush to commence 
military action in Afghanistan to pursue al-Qaeda and was asserted 
by President Barack Obama as authority for his "surge" policy 
announced in late 2009.135 
The creation and shaping of foreign policy is a complex and 
continual process and one that routinely lacks clarity and definition.136 
131. Id. 
132. See id. 
133. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40,115 Stat. 224 (2011) 
(codified at 50 U.S.c. § 1541 (2006». 
134. Id. § 2(a). 
135. See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Did Congress Approve America's 
Longest War?, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 27,2011), http://www.guardian.co.uklcommentisfree/ 
cifamerical2011/janl27/afghanistan-congress; Rick Klein, Key House Democrat: Obama 
Should Seek Congressional Approval for Afghanistan Surge, ABCNEWS.COM (Dec. 2, 
2009), http://abcnews.go.comlblogs/politics/2009/12Ikey-house-democrat-obama-should-
seek-congressional-approval-for-afghanistan-surge/. 
136. This Article does not specifically address the role of the Department of State in 
shaping foreign policy. As a department within the Executive Branch of the government, 
it faUs under the direct purview of the President and likely is central to any foreign policy 
statements or executive orders issued by the President. For a more detailed discussion on 
the role of the Department of State in foreign policy and international law, see generaUy 
Richard B. Bilder, International Law and United States Foreign Policy: Some Reflections 
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Based on both the defined and undefined powers of the executive 
branch, foreign policy can easily be subject to the whims of the 
President and his or her expansive or nonexpansive view of 
"executive power." As discussed above, foreign policy can be 
legislative in origin or adopted pursuant to an executive order issued 
by the President. Presidential executive orders are considered law 
within the executive branch until the current President or his 
successor modifies or repeals the order. 137 
For example, by Executive Order dated January 22, 2009, 
President Obama ordered the closure of the Guantanamo Bay facility 
within one year and required a review of the disposition of detainees 
before such closure, either by transfer to other countries, prosecution, 
or other disposition.138 Therefore, executive orders, like legislative 
enactments described above, are more ascertainable sources of 
foreign policy than policy statements made by the President and, 
consequently, may be a more reliable and determinable source of 
"established public policy." The Court relied on both sources of 
authority in Bob Jones University. 139 
However, executive orders can be rescinded the minute the 
officeholder changes, as is also the case with policy statements made 
by the President. With respect to policy statements, the President 
simply announces U.S. foreign policy with no readily available source 
such as a legislative act or an executive order. For example, President 
Obama announced on April 13, 2009, a series of changes in U.S. 
policy with respect to Cuba; in particular, the lifting of all restrictions 
on the travel of family members to Cuba and restrictions on 
remittances to family members in Cuba. 140 This Cuba policy, 
therefore, represents a statement of foreign policy with no 
corresponding legislative action or executive order. 
on the ASIVILA Report on the Role of the Legal Adviser, 1 TRANSNAT'LL. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 201 (1991). 
137. See JOHN CONTRUBIS, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., No. 95-722A, EXECUTIVE 
ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS 1-2 (1999), http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/wysiwyg! 
544/crs-95-772.pdf ("Often Presidents have relied upon Article II of the Constitution as 
the sole basis for issuing executive orders and proclamations."); see also U.s. CONST. art. 
II, § 3 ("[The President] shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed .... "). The 
Federal Register Act requires that executive orders and proclamations be published in the 
Federal Register. See 44 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006). 
138. See Exec. Order No. 13,492,3 C.F.R. 13492 (2010). 
139. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,593-95 (1983). 
140. See Memorandum from the Administration of Barack H. Obama to the Secretary 
of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce, 2009 DAILY 
COMPo PRES. DoC. 257 (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkgIDCPD-
200900257 Ipdf/DCPD-200900257. pdf. 
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With the potential transience of executive orders and policy 
statements, it is extremely difficult for charities to determine whether 
their international activities or funding violate some U.S. foreign 
policy. As noted by one scholar addressing domestic charities' 
compliance with fairly hefty investigatory tasks pursuant to the 
Treasury Department's Anti-Terrorist Funding Guidelines,141 most 
nonprofit organizations, and in particular smaller ones, are "not 
equipped to effectively carry out investigatory functions." 142 
Consequently, it is a much more attenuated argument that such 
policies constitute established public policy. 
This morass of U.S. foreign policies is a virtual minefield for 
domestic charities with any type or level of international activity. To 
mandate that such charities research every potential foreign policy 
implication of a proposed international activity is naIve, burdensome, 
and cost-prohibitive, especially for smaller charitable organizations. 
For these reasons alone, equating U.S. foreign policy with 
"established public policy" and potentially threatening a charitable 
organization's tax-exempt status on that ground is unfair and 
administratively unfeasible. Mandating that charitable organizations 
act consistently with U.S. foreign policy also results in significant 
compliance challenges for these organizations. Consequently, some 
system must be created whereby nonprofits may foresee that certain 
international activities may be deemed problematic from a tax 
exemption viewpoint. Then, instead of suffering the loss of their tax-
exempt status, organizations could disclose their activities and have 
the opportunity to comply with the requirements of the Code. 
Through this process, domestic charities would receive adequate 
notice and have a more realistic opportunity for compliance. 
B. International Law as an Established Source of Public Policy 
International law may provide a more ascertainable source of 
public policy than U.S. foreign policy, but nevertheless presents 
similar compliance challenges. International law develops over time 
and is tested by duration and practice of sovereign states or nations. 
This area of the law is commonly viewed as having two component 
parts: public, addressing the relations between nations, and private, 
involving foreign transactions of both individuals and business 
141. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES: 
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES (2005), http:// 
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releasesIDocuments/0929%2Of ina Ire vised. pdf. 
142. Gary W. Jenkins, Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy, 85 
N.C. L. REV. 773, 827 (2007). 
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entities. 143 Because no formal international legislative, executive, or 
judicial forums exist, international law is not always readily 
identifiable. Nevertheless, it is usually regarded as being drawn from 
two primary sources, generally originating from the consent of 
nations. l44 The first primary source is agreements entered into 
between nations via treaties or conventions. 145 A second source of 
international law is the "customary practice" or "course of dealing" 
between nations, or "customary international law."I46 A variation of 
customary international law is the concept that all nations observe 
certain legal norms that "are so fundamental as to be more or less 
automatically a part of international law," often referred to as 
"general principles of law."147 The difficulty in attempting to define 
what constitutes international law reveals the initial complication in 
integrating this area of law into domestic tax exemption law. 
Furthermore, if international law is not easily defined or accessible, 
domestic charities are faced with a compliance quagmire. 
One established component of international law is the 
agreements-treaties and conventions-that exist between nations. 
Under Article II of the Constitution, treaties ratified by the Senate 
constitute domestic law. 148 Article III of the Constitution includes 
within the scope of judicial power any cases arising under authorized 
treaties. 149 Finally, Article VI provides that authorized treaties shall 
be "the supreme law of the land."150 To further complicate matters, 
not all treaties having the benefit of Article VI are necessarily ratified 
under Article II; actually, most are not. 151 The great majority of 
143. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (4th ed. 
2003). 
144. See id. at 4-5. 
145. ld. at 5. 
146. ld. 
147. ld. 
148. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
149. ld. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Law of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority .... "). 
150. ld. art. VI, d. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding."). 
151. See JANIS, supra note 143, at 95. One treaty which the United States was 
instrumental in formulating but ultimately did not sign or ratify is the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of October 7, 1982. ld. at 219. It took more than a 
decade for the necessary sixty states to ratify the treaty. [d. at 219-20. A major reason was 
a dispute over deep sea mining rights, the provisions for which were amended in 1994, 
garnering the adoption of many of the industrialized countries. [d. The official position of 
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international agreements into which the United States enters are 
executive agreements, not treaties. 152 These agreements are either 
statutory or "congressional-executive" agreements where the 
President acts according to legislation, or the President enters into 
agreements without any congressional involvement. 153 Although the 
Constitution does not specifically address executive agreements, their 
validity as international compacts has been upheld both by Supreme 
Court decisions and historical practice. 154 As one legal scholar 
commented, "[t]he power of the President or of the President and 
Congress to make international agreements outside the boundaries of 
Article II is a controversial and still-developing area of the law."lS5 As 
a result, the complexity surrounding international agreements and 
whether such agreements become the "supreme law of the land" raise 
numerous issues and extremely difficult compliance questions for 
domestic charitable organizations with international activities. 
Considering the numerous types of treaties as well as the 
constitutional provisions applying to them, a fundamental question is 
whether a treaty benefitting from Article VI constitutes "established 
public policy" for purposes of the public policy doctrine. For example, 
the United Nations adopted and ratified the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
in 1965.156 This international convention was ratified by the United 
States in October 1994 and entered into force on November 20, 
the United States is that the Convention provisions that protect high seas freedoms 
constitute "customary international law upon which the United States was entitled to 
rely," but that it was not bound to those provisions relating to seabed rights because it did 
not sign or ratify the Convention. [d. at 225. As recently as July 2012, the Senate 
considered the treaty for ratification, but ultimately could not garner the necessary votes. 
See Keith Johnson, GOP Scuttles Law-oJ-Sea Treaty, WALL ST. J. BLOG (July 16, 2012, 
5:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwireI2012/07/16/gop-opposition-scuttles-law-of-sea-
treaty/. 
152. See HENKIN, supra note 114, at 215. 
153. See JANIS, supra note 143, at 95. 
154. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) ("[OJur cases 
have recognized that the President has authority to make 'executive agreements' with 
other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress, this 
power having been exercised since the early years of the Republic."); United States v. 
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,330 (1937) ("[A]n international compact ... is not always a treaty 
which requires the participation of the Senate."); MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & R. CHUCK 
MASON, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., R40614, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND 
RELATED ISSUES CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED 
BY THE UNITED STATES 2 (2012). 
155. JANIS, supra note 143, at 96. 
156. See G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. 
N6014, at 47 (Dec. 21, 1965). 
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1994.157 If a domestic charity's international activities and funding are 
deemed to violate this international convention due to racial 
preference as with the Israeli settlements, should that charity's tax 
exemption be revoked because it violated the law and, thus, 
"established public policy"? Similarly, another commentator has 
argued that domestic charities' support of the Israeli settlements 
violates the Geneva Convention, which prohibits removing local 
population from an occupied territory and then moving the 
conquering country's population into that area.15S Clearly, if these 
conventions constitute domestic law by operation of Article VI, then 
a violation thereof could implicate the public policy doctrine due to 
illegality. However, to date, the IRS has not issued any rulings or 
guidance addressing the probability that these types of violations 
trigger the doctrine.159 Alternatively, in situations where an 
international law is not directly adopted by the United States via 
Article II, Article VI does not otherwise apply, or a foreign country's 
law is implicated, then current tax-exemption law is silent as to 
whether such a violation of international law is contrary to 
"established public policy" and thus could jeopardize the charity's 
tax-exempt status. l60 
As discussed in the context of U.S. foreign policy, international 
law is also a minefield for domestic charities involved in any kind of 
international activity. For charities, especially smaller organizations, 
determining the potential applicability of international law to their 
activities is burdensome and cost-prohibitive. 161 Again, equating the 
violation of any potentially applicable international law with 
illegality, thus implicating the public policy doctrine, would result in 
significant compliance challenges for charitable organizations. 
157. See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Reports Submitted by 
States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Addendum, United States of America, <JI 3, 
U.N. Doc. CERD/C351!Add.1 (Sept. 21, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organizationl100294.pdf. 
158. See Weirich, supra note 11, at 338. 
159. See Brennen, supra note 37, at 391 n.2 (stating that the IRS has revoked tax-
exempt status on the basis of public policy only in instances where the organizations 
participated in racial discrimination, civil disobedience, or an illegal activity). 
160. See JAMES F. BLOOM, EDWARD D. LUff, & JOHN F. REILLY, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., FOREIGN AcrIVITIES OF DOMESTIC CHARITIES AND FOREIGN 
CHARITIES 14 (1992), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick92.pdf ("It is settled that 
the conduct of illegal activities or activities that are contrary to public policy may 
jeopardize IRC 501(c)(3) exempt status regardless of the locus of the activity. What is not 
settled, however, is whether an activity conducted in a foreign country is illegal for IRC 
501(c)(3) purposes because it is illegal under the laws of that country."}. 
161. See Jenkins, supra note 142, at 827, 835-37. 
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Clearly, as global philanthropy increases each year, U.S.-based 
charities need solid guidance with respect to their international 
activities. 
III. MOVING FORWARD-REFINING THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE 
TO ADDRESS CHARITIES' INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
The preceding discussion on both foreign policy and 
international law and whether they constitute "established public 
policy" illustrates the potential challenges that exist for domestic 
charitable organizations in this international realm. As discussed by 
many scholars, the public policy doctrine is potentially limitless in its 
application due to the uncertainty over which "norms" constitute 
"established public policy.,,162 This Part proposes two related 
solutions to address this possibility. 
A. Limited Codification of the Public Policy Doctrine 
One approach to addressing the public policy doctrine's 
potentially limitless application is to discard it completely. Although 
that approach has been examined, few scholars have concluded that 
elimination is the correct answer.163 Nevertheless, scholars have 
consistently questioned whether it is appropriate for the IRS to 
determine what constitutes "established public policy."l64 In addition, 
some scholars have examined the inconsistency of the IRS's public 
policy power under Bob Jones University with past precedent, and the 
potential problems that arise with this authority under the 
nondelegation doctrine. 165 Essentially, the non delegation doctrine 
"prevents Congress from delegating its legislative powers to another 
branch of government" such as the executive branch (and by 
delegation therein, the IRS).166 In the public policy context, the 
nondeiegation issue concerns the question of which governmental 
branch should determine what constitutes public policy. 
In his concurring opinion in Bob Jones University, Justice Powell 
advocated that Congress, not the IRS, possessed the authority to 
162. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra notes 107-08. 
164. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
165. See Brennen, supra note 37, at 411,413-27, and Buckles, supra note 39, at 443-59, 
for a more detailed discussion on these judicial and constitutional limitations. 
166. Buckles, supra note 39, at 443. The doctrine emanates from the separation of 
powers set forth initially in Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution. See id. For example, 
Article I's "Vesting Oause" states, "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested 
in a Congress of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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determine public policy, balancing all the "substantial interests" at 
issue.167 In evaluating the public policy doctrine in the context of 
racial discrimination, Professor Brennen concurred with Justice 
Powell's conclusion, further noting: 
In deciding where to strike the balance, Congress is empowered 
to conduct legislative hearings and examine societal 
perspectives and determine, for example, whether appropriate 
race-based affirmative action is necessarily against public 
policy. Moreover, democratic processes, not present in agency 
rulemaking, better ensure that Congress's striking of this 
balance is reflective of the populace. 168 
Therefore, the reasonable conclusion is that the power to create, or 
determine the existence of, public policy rests with Congress, not an 
administrative agency like the IRS. 
If elimination of the public policy doctrine is not a plausible 
solution, then Congress should validate the doctrine as a tenet of the 
charitable tax exemption via a well-tailored statutory codification. 
The doctrine's codification would impose some ascertainable 
boundaries to the doctrine and finally provide indispensable guidance 
to domestic charities. Nevertheless, a codification of the broad Bob 
Jones University constraint-that a charitable organization shall not 
violate "established public policy"-potentially raises constitutional 
nondelegation concerns because, as Professor Buckles concluded, it 
still "invites an administrative agency '" to articulate 'established 
public policy,' with absolutely no mention in any relevant revenue act 
of what policy is, let alone what affairs of national interest are even 
addressed by any such policy."169 
167. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 611 (1983) (Powell, J., 
concurring). Justice Powell stated: 
Id. 
[T]he balancing of these substantial interests is for Congress to perform. I am 
unwilling to join any suggestion that the Internal Revenue Service is invested with 
authority to decide which public policies are sufficiently "fundamental" to require 
denial of tax exemptions. Its business is to administer laws designed to produce 
revenue for the Government, not to promote "public policy." 
168. Brennen, supra note 37, at 426. Brennen further noted that Congress will not 
necessarily reach the "correct conclusion" in determining public policy, but Congress 
should "ideally" reach such conclusions "only after thoughtful and careful consideration." 
Id. at 426 n.193. 
169. Buckles, supra note 39, at 456-57. In evaluating certain Supreme Court decisions 
addressing the nondelegation doctrine, Professor Buckles raises concerns that a mere 
codification of the public policy doctrine as set forth in Bob Jones University will violate 
the main tenet of the nondelegation doctrine; namely that "[i]t provides no intelligible 
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To address these nondelegation concerns, Congress needs to not 
only codify the public policy doctrine, but also establish or define 
what constitutes public policy in the context of charitable 
organizations. It can statutorily provide broad outlines of what 
constitutes applicable public policy, such as racial discrimination, as 
well as specific sources of public policy, such as treaties and 
international conventions that have been ratified by the Senate under 
Article II of the Constitution. To address future public policy 
concerns, Congress could provide the IRS with statutory authority to 
implement a reportable transaction scheme, which it has employed in 
other areas of the Code such as prohibited tax shelters. 17o Such a 
scheme would provide Congress, and ultimately the IRS, with an 
ability to target or "list" certain domestic and international activities 
as inherently in conflict with tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) (Le., 
"listed transactions"). As with the current reportable transaction 
scheme in place for certain tax shelter transactions, a charitable 
organization involved in any listed transaction would be required to 
disclose that transaction to the IRS.l7l The benefit of this disclosure 
regime is twofold. It makes the IRS increasingly aware of certain 
types of problematic transactions so greater guidance can be 
provided, and it also grants the IRS an enforcement tool for 
violations, as discussed below. The courts, however, will 
unquestionably "remain the final arbiters,,172 of whether the IRS has 
utilized this reportable transaction scheme in accordance with 
congressional intent. 
Addressing the public policy dilemma through legislation will not 
be an easy task for Congress. Nonetheless, charities' increasing 
participation in international activities alone necessitates a 
principle, based upon an expressed legislative policy, to limit the actions of the Treasury 
Department in general or the IRS in particular." [d. at 457; see also Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (stating that Congress must put forth an 
intelligible principle when it confers decisionmaking authority and has failed in only two 
instances: where it provided "literally no guidance" and where it delegated authority over 
"the entire economy"); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944) (stating that 
Congress permissibly delegated authority when it "specified the basic conditions of fact 
upon whose existence or occurrence .. , it directs that its statutory command shall be 
effective"). 
170. See I.R.c. §§ 4965( e), 6707 A( c) (2006). A "reportable transaction" is defined as 
"any transaction with respect to which information is required to be included with a return 
or statement because, as determined under regulations prescribed under section 6011, 
such transaction is of a type which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax 
avoidance or evasion." [d. § 6707A(c)(1). 
171. See, e.g., id. §§ 6011(g), 6111(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(a) (as amended in 2010), 
301.6111-3 (as amended in 2011). 
172. See Buckles, supra note 39, at 477. 
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congressional response and a determination of public policy 
parameters going forward. As Justice Powell also stated in his Bob 
Jones University concurrence, the boundaries of the public policy 
doctrine clearly rest with Congress: 
Many questions remain [unanswered by the Court], such as 
whether organizations that violate other [public] policies should 
receive tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). These should be 
legislative policy choices. It is not appropriate to leave the IRS 
"on the cutting edge of developing national policy." The 
contours of public policy should be determined by Congress, 
not by judges or the IRS.173 
Therefore, this Article joins the chorus of other scholars and 
commentators calling upon Congress to finally address this public 
policy conundrum. 
B. Excise Tax Regime as an Alternative Enforcement Tool 
for Public Policy Violations 
The codification of the public policy doctrine should also include 
an excise tax to address public policy violations that are isolated 
andlor minor in relation to a charitable organization's overall tax-
exempt activities. As Professor Buckles has noted, the Supreme 
Court in Bob Jones University did not address whether a charitable 
organization's violation of law "always results in denial (or 
revocation) of exemption."174 Actually, as Buckles further illustrated, 
the Supreme Court explicitly alluded to the possibility that a 
charitable organization may violate a law or public policy yet 
nevertheless confer an overall public benefit, but stopped short of 
concluding that it would violate the public policy doctrine. 175 Buckles 
furthermore raised the issue that "[p]erhaps isolated acts [of public 
policy violations] should be adjudicated differently from a pattern of 
173. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,612 (1983) (Powell, J. concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
174. See Buckles, supra note 39, at 410. 
175. [d.; see also Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 596 n.21 ("In view of our conclusion that 
racially discriminatory private schools violate fundamental public policy and cannot be 
deemed to confer a benefit on the public, we need not decide whether an organization 
providing a public benefit and otherwise meeting the requirements of § 501(c)(3) could 
nevertheless be denied tax-exempt status if certain of its activities violated a law or public 
policy."). 
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illegal behavior."176 Even the IRS has intimated that isolated illegal 
acts may be less fatal to exempt status. 177 
Fundamentally, an excise tax regime would serve as an 
alternative to revocation of tax-exempt status for these isolated public 
policy violations. To illustrate, assume that a domestic charitable 
organization conducts educational and charitable activities that 
support the nation of Israel, targeting funds to schools, community 
centers, and synagogues. However, the organization sent $1,000,000 
in 2010 to support East Jerusalem settlements, which is now a listed 
transaction (i.e., violates "established public policy") under the new 
statutory regime discussed above. Under this excise tax system, 
similar to other excise taxes imposed on public charities under § 4958 
or private foundations under § 4941, the IRS can impose an excise tax 
on the organization and potentially require correction of the 
prohibited activity-for instance, that the organization recoup the 
funds to the extent possible and forgo any additional activities of this 
kind in the future. 178 As with other excise tax regimes currently in 
place, the assessed tax would be greater if the organization knew or 
had reason to know that the channeling of its funds constituted a 
prohibited transaction. 179 Congress need not create a new excise tax 
for public policy violations; rather, it can utilize § 4965, which subjects 
certain tax-exempt entities to an excise tax for becoming parties to 
prohibited tax shelter transactions. 18o The meaning of "prohibited tax 
shelter transaction" is defined in a cross-referenced section on 
reportable transactions in the tax shelter context. 181 The statute could 
be amended to similarly subject certain listed transactions to the 
excise tax under the new statutory scheme described above. Although 
§ 4965 does not currently contain any provisions on correction of the 
prohibited transaction, Congress can easily amend the section to 
provide for correction with respect to listed transactions involving 
public policy violations. 
The imposition of this excise tax on public policy violations, like 
the excise tax on excess benefit transactions under § 4958, provides 
the IRS with an "intermediate sanction" alternative to revoking an 
176. Buckles, supra note 39, at 410. 
177. See Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 c.B. 204, 205 ("The intentional nature of this 
encouragement [to commit illegal acts] precludes the possibility that the organization 
might unfairly fail to qualify for exemption due to an isolated or inadvertent violation of a 
regulatory statute."). 
178. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 4941(e)(3), 4958(f)(6) (2006). 
179. See id. §§ 4941(a)(1), 4958. 
180. See id. § 4965(a). 
181. [d. § 4965(e)(1). 
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organization's tax-exempt status for isolated or minor public policy 
violations. The excise tax would allow the organization to continue its 
many other exempt purpose activities and not adversely affect either 
the charitable programs it administers or the charitable class that 
benefits from those programs. 
C. Difficulties and Potential Criticisms 
These proposals-codification of the public policy doctrine along 
with a reportable transaction scheme and an excise tax enforcement 
tool-are not without pitfalls and criticisms. The primary criticism is 
that this will add another layer of legal requirements for, and 
regulation of, charitable organizations and will actually increase IRS 
participation and oversight. Clearly, additional regulation and less 
autonomy for charitable organizations is a valid concern. 182 However, 
this Article is more concerned with the potentially limitless 
application of the public policy doctrine, particularly in the 
international realm, and the lack of overall guidance with respect to 
the impact of international activities on domestic tax exemption. 
Elimination of a potential plethora of issues for charitable 
organizations with international activities is arguably preferable and 
may be a fair tradeoff for potentially greater regulation. If Congress 
and the IRS issue sufficient guidance, charities can comply and avoid 
troublesome activities, thereby precluding the need for excessive IRS 
oversight. Furthermore, charities involved in international grant-
making are already advised to regularly monitor the Specially 
Designated Nationals list maintained by the Treasury Department's 
Office of Foreign Assets Control to ensure they are not directly or 
indirectly supporting terrorist organizations and, thus, risking 
automatic suspension of their tax-exempt status. IS3 Therefore, 
charities operating in the international realm are already equipped-
182. See generally Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation and Charity 
Autonomy: How Public Is Private Philanthropy?, 85 CHT.-KENT L. REV. 571, 616 (2010) 
("Clearly, impairing the independence, autonomy and fundamentally private nature of 
foundations and other charities could have serious consequences for them, the sector, and 
broader society, particularly if grounded on a theory that lacks meaningful support in law, 
history, or policy."). 
183. See J. Christine Harris, IRS ExpLains Current Developments Concerning Charities, 
OMBWATCH (Nov. 22, 2004), http://www.ombwatch.orglnode/4499. See supra note 5 and 
accompanying text for a brief discussion of tax exemption suspension due to support of a 
terrorist organizations pursuant to § 501(p). A description of the Treasury Department's 
Office of Foreign Assets Control as well as a link to the Specially Designated Nationals list 
is available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure!offices/Pages!Office-
of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx. 
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to some extent-to monitor both guidance and reportable 
transactions targeting certain international activities. 
The IRS appears to be acutely aware of the tightrope it must 
walk with respect to charities and their international activities. As one 
tax law specialist acknowledged with respect to charities and terrorist 
organizations guidance in 2004, the IRS has a "fine line to dance" in 
safeguarding charitable funds from ending up with terrorist 
organizations, but "at the same time, we must avoid taking actions 
that will inadvertently hurt the charitable communities' ability to 
provide funds and services in places ... that have a great need for 
charitable giving."l84 It seems reasonable to conclude that the IRS 
would apply that same sensitivity in utilizing any reportable 
transaction mechanism enacted by Congress in the public policy 
doctrine context. The court system will provide the ultimate check to 
IRS actions in this realm. 185 Finally, uniform treatment of charitable 
organizations and overall compliance by such organizations are 
potential benefits of these proposals that can counterbalance any 
regulatory and compliance burdens. 
Another criticism is that this public policy concern, especially in 
the international context, is insignificant.186 Again, the potential 
plethora of issues facing charitable organizations in the international 
realm cannot be underestimated or overly discounted. Although 
educated minds can disagree over whether the Z Street controversy 
implicitly raises a public policy issue, the mere possibility that it might 
represent a merger of public policy with foreign policy or 
international law should be sufficiently disconcerting to warrant 
further exploration and discussion. Ultimately, this Article's 
proposals are not intended to preclude necessary discussion of the 
real issues confronted by charities with respect to their international 
activities. Specifically, it is likely that the proposals set forth herein 
are not the only avenues to a viable solution. Because so much of 
international law, including U.S. foreign policy, involves "policy," the 
public policy doctrine seems to be one natural path to a solution. 
Furthermore, with so many scholars having called for Congress to 
address the public policy doctrine and its flaws, with some necessary 
boundaries,l87 the international law and policy issues confronting 
charities offer even more reasons for Congress to finally confront the 
public policy doctrine conundrum. Nevertheless, this Article's 
184. Harris, supra note 183. 
185. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
186. See Buckles, supra note 39, at 460. 
187. See sources cited supra note 107. 
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primary purpose is to confront some of the difficulties that may 
confront charities operating in the international realm, raise further 
awareness to these issues, and offer some potential solutions that will 
hopefully engender additional discussion. 
CONCLUSION 
As global philanthropy continually increases, domestic charities 
need solid guidance with respect to their international activities, 
including whether the public policy doctrine is implicated. This 
Article has examined the public policy doctrine as the one component 
of charitable exemption law that is potentially implicated by charities' 
international activities. However, the doctrine, which can be utilized 
by the IRS to deny or revoke a charitable organization's tax·exempt 
status, lacks definition with respect to its scope, sources of public 
policy, and the IRS's authority to determine what constitutes 
"established public policy." 
This Article agrees with other legal scholars that the doctrine 
cries out for congressional attention, especially considering the 
international law and policy issues potentially implicated by the 
doctrine. Nevertheless, the automatic inclusion of U.S. foreign policy 
and international law as components of "established public policy" 
would be both administratively impracticable and onerous and would 
result in significant compliance difficulties for charitable 
organizations. The potential transience of U.S. foreign policy and the 
difficulty in defining what constitutes international law both illustrate 
the initial complexity of integrating these into domestic tax 
exemption law. 
Accordingly, this Article proposes congressional action with 
respect to the doctrine, accompanied by a reportable transaction 
scheme and excise tax as additional enforcement tools. Ultimately, if 
Congress and the IRS can issue comprehensive and clear guidance, 
charities can comply and avoid troublesome international activities, 
hopefully leading to minimal, but necessary, IRS oversight. The 
ultimate goal should be to ensure that charitable organizations can 
continue to provide funds and services to the international 
communities and causes that need it the most. 
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